ER 82-12493 OEXA 82-2451

3 December 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	Director, Office of External Affairs	STAT
SUBJECT:	Information on Address to the National Defense University	
1. Action	Requested: None; for information only.	
University on We Eisenhower Hall, 10:00 a.m. Lt. University, will to the reception will meet with the Laingen; Command Commandant of the	dend: You are scheduled to address the National Defense densday, 15 December from 10:15-11:30 a.m. in the Dwight D. Fort McNair. They have requested that you arrive at Gen. John Pustay, President of the National Defense meet you at the entrance of the building and escort you room where coffee and tea will be available. There you she Vice President of the University, Ambassador L. Bruce lant of the National War College, Maj. Gen. Lee Surut; and lee Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Rear Adm. Ronald a.m. you will proceed to the auditorium where Gen. Pustay you.	
is to last about period. All attalecture will be	research fellows and CIA personnel. The moderator will be faculty member of the University. The lecture states are cleared through Top Secret/non compartmented. The non-attributable and off-the-record. No press will be present. I be taken of you and Gen. Pustay but will not be released to	
coordinated with	ndation: None; attached are proposed remarks which have been SOVA and OSWR. Also attached is a map of Ft. McNair and additional information on the University.	
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IN JULY 1876, THE BODY OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG

CUSTER WAS FOUND BY A THEN LITTLE KNOWN STREAM CALLED LITTLE

BIGHORN. CUSTER WAS QUITE DEAD--THE RESULT OF POOR

INTELLIGENCE, POOR JUDGMENT AND HIS OWN ARROGANCE. IN THESE

TIMES, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO PROVIDE POOR INTELLIGENCE OR POOR

JUDGMENT TO THE PRESIDENT, AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO BASIS FOR

ARROGANCE. THERE IS A WIDE ARRAY OF THINGS WE NEED TO KEEP

CLOSE TABS ON THAT REQUIRES HIGH VIGILANCE AND INCREASED

RESOURCES.

THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S NUMBER ONE PRIORITY; AND HIGH ON EVERYONE'S INTEREST LIST IS THE RECENT LEADERSHIP CHANGES. THE ABSENCE OF AN OPGANIZED PROCEDURE FOR SUCCESSION MAKES EVALUATION OF POWER SHIFTS AN UNCERTAIN BUSINESS.

THIS IS ONLY THE FOURTH TIME IN 65 YEARS OF HISTORY
THAT SUPREME POWER HAS PASSED FROM ONE LEADER TO ANOTHER.
THE SPEED WITH WHICH YURI ANDROPOV ASSUMED POWER SUGGESTS HE
HAS A POWERFUL COALITION BEHIND HIM. HIS RISE WAS BACKED BY
TWO OF THE MOST REPRESSIVE STATE BUREAUCRACIES—THE SECRET
POLICE AND THE MILITARY. NO LEADER IS CURRENTLY IN A POSITION
TO MOUNT A CHALLENGE TO HIM AS PARTY LEADER AND HE HAS MOVED
RAPIDLY TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS CHIEF SPOKESMAN ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS. PARTY SECRETARY KIRILENKO'S REMOVAL ELIMINATES A MAJOR RIVAL. ANOTHER RIVAL WAS REMOVED WITH CHERNENKO'S SELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF ONE OF THE TWO FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSIONS. TWO OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURES ON THE POLITBURO, DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ARE CLOSE ASSOCIATES.

WE DON'T KNOW WITH MUCH CONFIDENCE WHAT TO EXPECT FROM ANDROPOV. HE GAVE SOME HINTS IN A STATEMENT IN LATE NOVEMBER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM WHEN HE STRESSED ARMS CONTROL, U.S. CONCESSIONS ON START AND INF, ANTI-CORRUPTION, AND HOLDING THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PLAN.

WHAT ANDROPOV CAN DO TO CHANGE THINGS IS ANOTHER QUESTION; AND IT DEPENDS ON HIS ABILITY TO KEEP INTACT THE COALITION THAT PUT HIM IN POWER. HE OWES POLITICAL DEBTS TO ALLIES SUCH AS GROMYKO AND USTINOV. THESE ARE LEADERS OF INDEPENDENT STATURE WHO WILL DEMAND A SHARE OF POWER. THE POLITBURO AS A WHOLE CAN AND PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE THAT NO MAJOR DECISION BE MADE WITHOUT ITS APPROVAL.

GUNS VERSUS BUTTER ISSUE IS AN INCREASINGLY CONTENTIOUS
ISSUE WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE ECONOMIC TASKS ARE
FORMIDABLE. SOVIET AGRICULTURE HAS SUFFERED FOUR SUCCESSIVE
CROP FAILURES AND THERE IS A GROWING SENSE OF MALAISE OVER

THE QUALITY OF LIFE. SOVIET SOCIETY SUFFERS FROM DECLINING HEALTH. IT IS THE ONLY INDUSTRIALIZED NATION WHERE THE LIFE EXPECTANCY FOR MEN IS ACTUALLY DECLINING. ALCOHOL ADDICTION AND CORRUPTION ARE RAMPANT. AT BEST, THE SOVIET ECONOMY WILL ONLY GROW FROM 1 TO 1.5 PERCENT PER YEAR FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.

TO RELIGHT THE ECONOMY, SOME ARGUE FOR MORE ATTENTION
TO THE CONSUMER SECTOR; OTHERS FOR THE INCREASED INVESTMENT
IN HEAVY INDUSTRY. ANDROPOV'S CLOSEST TIES HAVE BEEN TO
ADVOCATES OF THE LATTER COURSE.

WHILE THERE IS A PROPENSITY FOR A NEW SOVIET LEADER
TO ADDRESS CONSUMER PRODUCT SHORTAGES WHEN HE FIRST TAKES
COMMAND, OVER THE LONG RUN, ANDROPOV WILL PROBABLY FIND IT
POLITICALLY NECESSARY TO PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON SATISFYING
THE MILITARY. SOVIET CENTRALIZED PLANNING VIRTUALLY
GUARANTEES A STEADY FLOW OF RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY AND IT
WILL BE HARD TO INTERRUPT. CHIEFS OF CIVILIAN MINISTRIES FIND
IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT POLITICALLY DANGEROUS TO
CHALLENGE THE MILITARY'S PRIORITY. FEW OFFICIALS ARE PRIVY TO
THE DETAILS OF DEFENSE PLANS AND BUDGETS, THEREBY PREVENTING
A THOROUGH SCRUTINY OF PROGRAMS OR OPEN DEBATE ON PRIORITIES.
KEY MILITARY DECISIONMAKERS HAVE LONG TENURES. MINISTER OF
DEFENSE USTINOV BECAME A DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL MANAGER IN THE

1930'S AND IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF ANDROPOV. USTINOV IS PROBABLY THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN THE NEW LEADERSHIP BEHIND ANDROPOV.

THE UNRELENTING BUILDUP OF SOVIET FORCES SINCE THE	
EARLY 1960s HAS BEEN FED AND SUSTAINED BY A GROWING DEFENSE	
INDUSTRY. THE SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL BASE NOW INCLUDES	
SOME 200 MAJOR WEAPON R&D FACILITIES AND 100 FINAL ASSEMBLY	
PLANTS AS WELL AS THOUSANDS OF DEFENSE-RELATED R&D AND	
COMPONENT OR SUPPORT FACILITIES.	25 X 1
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NOR HAVE WE SEEN ANY EVIDENCE OF A REDUCTION IN SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING DESPITE DECLINING ECONOMIC GROWTH. ON THE BASIS OF OBSERVED MILITARY ACTIVITY WE EXPECT DEFENSE SPENDING TO GROW THROUGH 1985 BUT THE RATE OF GROWTH IS UNCERTAIN GIVEN THE PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.

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IMPROVEMENTS IN THE 1980S. ADVANCES WILL BE MADE THROUGH MORE HARD-HITTING WEAPONS AND IMPROVED COMMAND AND CONTROL. BECAUSE SOVIET DOCTRINE EMPHASIZES THE OFFENSIVE, THE TANK REMAINS THEIR CENTERPIECE WEAPON. A NEW TANK--A FOLLOW ON TO THE T-80--IS EXPECTED, INCORPORATING NEW CONCEPTS IN ARMOR PROTECTION. ALSO DUE TO BE INTRODUCED IN THE 1980S ARE TWO NEW AIR-TO-AIR FIGHTERS, A FIGHTER BOMBER, SEVERAL ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILES--SOME WITH LASER GUIDANCE SYSTEMS--AND A GROUND BASED BATTLEFIELD LASER

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FROM MOSCOW'S VIEWPOINT NOWHERE ARE THE STAKES HIGHER
THAN IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER; BUT THEY DO FACE SERIOUS
PROBLEMS, A DECLINING BIRTH RATE AND A GROWING PROPORTION OF
POLITICALLY UNRELIABLE NON-SLAVIC CONSCRIPTS. RECENT EVENTS
IN POLAND RAISE THE UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTION OF THE RELIABILITY
OF EAST EUROPEAN COHORTS.

THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION IS, HOWEVER, MUCH BROADER THAN THE DIRECT MILITARY THREAT. THE SOVIETS VIEW THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AS A TOTAL, ENCOMPASSING STRUGGLE INVOLVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS WHICH THEY CALL "THE CORRELATION OF FORCES." IN THE LAST SEVEN YEARS, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED A MIX OF TACTICS--POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, SUBVERSION, TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY--

TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE AND DESTABLIZE GOVERNMENTS. IT
IS A NO-LOSE PROPOSITION BECAUSE THEY CAN STAY HALF-HIDDEN
IN THE BACKGROUND. EXPLOITING THIRD WORLD SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DISCONTENTS GIVES THE SOVIETS A WEDGE INTO A
COUNTRY, A BASE TO FEED THE MALAISE THAT FOSTERS INSURGENCIES.
THE SOVIETS WORK IN CONCERT WITH CUBA, AND TO SOME EXTENT
LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, ANGOLA, SOUTH YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA.

WHILE CUBA MIGHT NOT CONSIDER ITSELF A SOVIET SURROGATE,

MOSCOW MOST ASSUREDLY DOES. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID ALONE

TO CUBA EXCEEDS \$3 BILLION A YEAR IN ADDITION TO SUBSTANTIAL

MILITARY AID. ALL TOLD WE ESTIMATE THE SOVIETS PROVIDE

CUBA IN EXCESS OF \$1 PER DAY FOR EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND

CHILD, OR SOME \$10 MILLION PER DAY. THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS

AID PROGRAM VIRTUALLY ENSURES CASTRO'S SUPPORT TO MOSCOW
BACKED INSURGENCIES.

IN GENERAL, SOVIET ARM DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLD HAVE STEADILY INCREASED WITH AN 80 PERCENT RISE IN RUBLE PRICES AND HAVE BECOME AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF HARD CURRENCY FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

EACH OF THE 11 NATIONS FACED WITH INSURGENCIES IN THE WORLD TODAY HAPPENS TO BE CLOSE TO THE NATURAL RESOURCES OR TO THE SEA LANES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

MUST DEPEND TO SUSTAIN THEIR ECONOMIC LIFE. CENTRAL AMERICA HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY FERTILE GROUND. THE SANDANISTAS' SUCCESS IN NICARAGUA--WITH HELP FROM CUBA--PROVIDED THE SOVIETS A FOOTHOLD TO EXPAND THEIR LINKS WITH LEFTISTS IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS.

THE SOVIETS' BASIC AIM IS TO UNDERMINE U.S. INFLUENCE. MOSCOW ANTICIPATES THAT REVOLUTIONARY FERMENT IN AMERICA'S OWN BACKYARD WILL DIVERT OUR ATTENTION AND RESOURCES FROM MORE DISTANT PROBLEMS, SOW DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, AND UNDERCUT WASHINGTON'S CREDIBILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD.

THESE S	SOVIET GOALS CAN BE THW	ARTED: BUT IT TAKES
CONCERTED, S	SUSTAINED U.S. ACTION.	EL SALVADOR OFFERS THE
BEST EXAMPLE	£ .	

THAT THE WORLD'S TELEVISION AUDIENCE SAW FOR THE FIRST
TIME THE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR OF THE GUERRILLAS CONTRASTED
BY THE LONG LINES OF EL SALVADORAN CITIZENS WAITING
PATIENTLY FOR LONG HOURS IN THE HOT SUN FOR THEIR CHANCE
TO VOTE.

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OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS WE HAVE BEEN REBUILDING OUR RESOURCES. WE HAVE STARTED ON A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTORS AND HAVE HIRED MORE ANALYSTS TO ADDRESS AREAS OF NEW INTEREST--THE THIRD WORLD, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND GLOBAL RESOURCES. WE HAVE CREATED NEW ANALYTICAL CENTERS DEALING WITH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. CENTERS FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ANALYSIS ON RAPIDLY EVOLVING ISSUES. ALTHOUGH HORRIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE, THE MONSTER KNOWN AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS BECOME A GROWTH INDUSTRY. TERRORISTS, MOREOVER, HAVE MADE AMERICAN FACILITIES THEIR MOST FAVORED TARGETS. WE WERE THE TARGETS OF ROUGHLY ONE-THIRD OF ALL INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING THE PAST 10 YEARS. ALMOST 200 AMERICANS HAVE BEEN KILLED BY SUCH ATTACKS SINCE 1968. WHILE ONE-HALF OF THESE WERE VICTIMS OF INDISCRIMINATE ACTS, THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS SINGLED OUT FOR ASSASSINATION INCREASED STEADILY DURING THE 1970s.

LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONCERN OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. LEAKS HAVE REACHED EPIDEMIC PROPORTIONS—MORE THAN 250 WERE REPORTED AND INVESTIGATED IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN 1981. THE COMMUNITY SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO BACK DOWN FROM THIS PROBLEM. IT AFFECTS OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT CERTAIN ASSETS OVERSEAS; LOWERS MORALE OF OUR PERSONNEL. LEAKS CAUSE US A LOSS IN INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS; HARMS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONTAINING LEAKS ARE APPARENT.

DESPITE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S STRONG EFFORTS ON CONTAINMENT,

CONFUSION STILL PERSISTS IN EQUATING THE WHISTLEBLOWER WITH

THE LEAKER. WHILE THE WHISTLEBLOWER CAN SERVE JUSTICE, THE

LEAKER SERVES ONLY HIMSELF AND HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS.

MOREOVER, EXISTING ESPIONAGE LAWS DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES

TO LEGAL SANCTIONS. LEGAL ACTION IS OFTENTIMES PERCEIVED

AS OVERKILL; PROSECUTION CAN OFTEN INVOLVE THE POTENTIAL FOR

DISCLOSURE OF FURTHER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

WE ARE LOOKING INTO NEW LEGISLATION FOCUSED EXPLICITLY ON CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AS WELL AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT-WIDE POLICY AND REGULATIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST LEAKERS, INCLUDING TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT IF WARRANTED. PASSAGE THIS YEAR OF THE

INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT IS EVIDENCE OF THIS

ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO STOPPING DAMAGING DISCLOSURES

AND EVIDENCE THAT CONGRESS UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR

EFFORTS.

WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO SECURITY INDOCTRINATION OF ALL EMPLOYEES INCLUDING APPOINTED OFFICIALS AND ARE IN THE PROCESS OF GAINING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND JOINT ACTION ON PURSUING LEAK INVESTIGATIONS WITH GREATER VIGOR AND DETERMINATION. WITHIN CIA, WE HAVE FORMALIZED A PREPUBLICATION REVIEW PROCESS FOR ALL CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES. SENIOR OFFICIALS ACROSS ALL AGENCY DIRECTORATES THOROUGHLY SCRUTINIZE MANUSCRIPTS, FICTION AND NON-FICTION, TO ENSURE NO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED. AS MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY, YOU ARE ONLY TOO AWARE OF HOW THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF UNRELATED LEAKS CAN GIVE OUR ADVERSARIES AN EDGE IN MILITARY STRATEGY, EVEN ENDANGER THE LIVES OF OUR DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY OFFICIALS STATIONED ABROAD. I WANT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE I PLACE ON SECURITY FOR THE CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE AND ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE GOING TO ALLOCATE WHATEVER RESOURCES WE NEED TO BRING IT UNDER CONTROL.

STILL ANOTHER CONTINUING, HIGHLY DAMAGING THREAT CAN ONLY BE CALLED A HEMORRHAGE. ONLY RECENTLY HAVE WE

ESTABLISHED THE DEGREE TO WHICH ACCURACY, THE PRECISION,
AND THE POWER OF SOVIET WEAPONS, WHICH WE ARE REQUIRED NOW
TO COUNTER WITH BUDGET-BUSTING APPROPRIATIONS, ARE BASED
ON WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN WE EVER
DREAMED.

SOVIET DEFENSE PLANTS ROUTINELY USE WESTERN R&D APPROACHES, AND OUR BLUEPRINTS--OBTAINED LEGALLY AND ILLEGALLY--TO SHORTEN WEAPON LEADTIMES. FOR PROJECTS IN THE EARLIEST STAGES OF R&D, OUR STOLEN OR PURCHASED TECHNOLOGY CAN SHORTEN LEADTIMES OF MORE THAN A DECADE NEEDED TO FIELD A NEW WEAPON BY TWO TO FIVE YEARS. SOVIET LEGAL AND CLANDESTINE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN OUR TECHNOLOGY HAVE BECOME LARGER, MORE SOPHISTICATED, AND BETTER MANAGED. SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS, THE KGB AND THE GRU, HAVE FOR YEARS BEEN TRAINING YOUNG SCIENTISTS TO TARGET AND ROAM THE WORLD TO ACQUIRE TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR MILITARY ARSENAL. THE ACQUISITION EFFORT IS LIKELY TO INCREASE DURING THE 1980S AND TO FOCUS HEAVILY ON MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES. FUTURE SOVIET MILITARY NEEDS ALSO DICTATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADVANCE COMPONENT AND SUBSYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES.

THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN MICROELECTRONICS IS ONE OF
THE MOST STRIKING EXAMPLES OF HOW THE SOVIETS HAVE RESORTED
TO ESPIONAGE, BRIBERY, COVERT OR OPEN PURCHASES TO FUEL THEIR

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MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE. OVER THE PAST DECADE, THE ABILITY TO MAKE HIGH-QUALITY MICROELECTRONIC COMPONENTS HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT FOR MISSILES AND PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS, AS WELL AS MODERN AIRBORNE RADAR, FIRE-CONTROL, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAVE LAGGED IN THE REQUIRED MANUFACTURING AND FABRICATION TECHNOLOGIES. THEIR SOLUTION-TO ACQUIRE WESTERN MICROELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY VALUED AT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS. MUCH OF THIS WAS CLANDESTINELY OBTAINED.

THE DAMAGE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY BECOMES ALL TOO OBVIOUS AS WE FACE THE NEED TO SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST NEW SOVIET WEAPONS. OBVIOUSLY, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS GOING TO HAVE TO DEVOTE THE NECESSARY RESOURCES TO TRACK THESE SOVIET EFFORTS, AND WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN. AT CIA, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CENTER; BUT THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS PROBLEM IS SUCH THAT ALL CONCERNED AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT—THE FBI, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, AND STATE WILL HAVE TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS AND CLOSELY COORDINATE ACTIVITIES.

MOST OF YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE INSTITUTED A NEW FAST
TRACK SYSTEM THAT CAN PRODUCE NATIONAL ESTIMATES ON ISSUES
COMING UP FOR POLICY DECISION VERY QUICKLY. PERHAPS MORE
IMPORTANT, WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO ASSURE STANDARDS OF

INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY, ACCURACY AND INDEPENDENCE, AS WELL AS RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS TO THE NATIONAL ESTIMATE PROCESS. THE CHIEFS OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--DIA, NSA, STATE'S INR, ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINE CORPS, TREASURY, FRI, ENERGY--SIT ON THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND FUNCTION AS A BOARD OF ESTIMATES. EACH CHIEF AT THE TABLE IS CHARGED WITH SEEING THAT THE INFORMATION AND THE JUDGMENTS COMING OUT OF HIS ORGANIZATION ARE REFLECTED IN THE ESTIMATE. I'M RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ESTIMATE BUT I CHARGE MYSELF TO SEE THAT ALL SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIATED JUDGMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY ARE REFLECTED SO THAT IN POLICY FORMULATION AND DECISION-MAKING THE FULL RANGE OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY IS ON THE TABLE. I BELIEVE THIS PROCESS HAS DONE A GREAT DEAL TO DEVELOP A NEW SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE COLLABORATION AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE STRENGTHENING AND EXTENSION OF OUR CAPABILITIES

IS BEING ENCOURAGED AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED. WE HAVE A

COMPLETED COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES

WE SEE FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE, THE ADEQUACY OF OUR

CURRENT COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES TO MEET THEM

AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO OVERCOME THE INADEQUACIES. WE HAVE

RECENTLY COMPLETED A SIMILAR REVIEW OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE

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ONE OF MY PRIME OBJECTIVES HAS BEEN TO GET BETTER MUTUAL SUPPORT AMONG THE COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND BETWEEN THE DIRECTORATES AND THE OFFICES OF THE CIA. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND INR AT STATE ARE CARRYING AS MUCH AS ONE-THIRD OF THE DRAFTING OF THE EXPANDED ESTIMATES PROGRAM. MONTHLY WARNING MEETINGS DID NOT YIELD A CLOSE ENOUGH WATCH AND THEY ARE NOW SUPPLEMENTED BY A WATCH MEETING EVERY THURSDAY IN WHICH THE CHIEF OF OUR INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE MEETS WITH THE CHIEFS OF DIA, STATE/INR, AND NSA TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH A WEEKLY WATCH REPORT ON FRIDAY MORNING. ONE OF MY SPECIAL INTERESTS OF LATE HAS BEEN TO

ENERGIZE ANALYSTS TO ACTIVELY AND REGULARLY SPECIFY
INFORMATION GAPS THEIR ANALYTICAL WORK POINTS UP. WE NEED
THIS TO ASSURE THAT OUR EXTENSIVE TECHNICAL AND HUMAN
COLLECTION ABILITIES ARE DRIVEN PRIMARILY BY THE INTELLIGENCE
NEEDS OF ANALYSTS AND DECISIONMAKERS RATHER THAN BY OUR
COLLECTION CAPABILITIES.

FINALLY, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

THE PRESS HAS, AT TIMES, MISUNDERSTOOD MY POSITION. WE ARE NOT CALLING FOR THE TOTAL REPEAL OF THE ACT, NOR ARE WE ASKING FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE PRIVACY ACT, WHICH GIVES ALL AMERICANS THE RIGHT TO SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT THEMSELVES. BUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED BY LAW TO SEARCH THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS FOR MATERIALS WHICH IT KNOWS IN ADVANCE ARE NOT RELEASABLE.

LET ME GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF THE ABSURD SITUATIONS WE FACE.

THE IRANIAN REGIME--THE SAME GOVERNMENT THAT HELD OUR PEOPLE
HOSTAGE--HAS RECENTLY FILED AN FOIA REQUEST FOR ALL INFORMATION
IN CIA ON THE LATE SHAH. THIS IS A PERFECTLY LEGAL REQUEST.

WE ARE THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD WHICH GIVES FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OR OTHERS HOSTILE TO OUR INTERESTS LEGAL
LICENSE TO POKE INTO OUR FILES. AS JUSTICE GOLDBERG ONCE

SAID, "WHILE THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS AGAINST INVASION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, IT IS NOT A SUICIPE PACT."

THANK YOU LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, FOR INVITING ME TODAY.

WE ARE NOW WORKING TO REBUILD INTELLIGENCE. IT WILL NOT

COME EASY OR FAST, BUT OUR COMMITMENT IS FIRM. THANK YOU.